Denouncing historical ‘misfortunes':From passive injustice to reflective spectatorship by Mihai, Mihaela
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denouncing historical ‘misfortunes'
Citation for published version:
Mihai, M 2014, 'Denouncing historical ‘misfortunes': From passive injustice to reflective spectatorship'
Political Theory, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 443-467. DOI: 10.1177/0090591714544706
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1177/0090591714544706
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Political Theory
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
Mihaela Mihai 
University of York 
mihaela.mihai@york.ac.uk 
 
Denouncing Historical “Misfortunes”: From Passive Injustice to Reflective 
Spectatorshipi 
 
Introduction 
Denunciations refer to public statements of condemnation targeting unjust acts, practices, 
institutions, or persons. Typically, they occupy positions on a continuum between “a social 
critique that points out an injustice in its most general aspect without necessarily calling for 
reparations” and “an individual critique that targets an individual, in the sense of denouncing 
someone to the authorities for the purpose of having a sanction applied.”ii They are usually 
proclaimed in the name of the common good of the relevant community. Due to their 
prominence as weapons of political control within non-democratic regimes (e.g. Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany), as convenient mechanisms for eliminating 
political enemies and stifling dissent during revolutionary moments (e.g. revolutionary 
France, Maoist China), and as expressions of “public disgust” towards various groups (e.g. 
homosexuals, heretics), denunciations have a bad reputation. Often hailed as a virtuous civic 
act, denunciations have too easily and too often degenerated into delation: a self-interested, 
abusive, “civil homicide”.iii  
While denunciations have greatly preoccupied historians,iv political theory has been 
rather silent on the topic. This paper seeks to contribute a theoretical account of such 
practices. It argues there is nothing intrinsically problematic with denunciations: when 
oriented by a commitment to the guiding principles of constitutional democracies and 
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resonating in the wider society they can kick-start important political debates. I will not 
address denunciations of individuals by individuals directed to the authorities for the purpose 
of punishment.v Instead, I focus on the harder case of denunciations that target complex 
injustices, i.e. injustices that involve, beyond the direct perpetrators, many who allowed or 
even condoned the abuses in the past and who now benefit from turning a blind eye. Such 
injustices are, more often than not, invisible: they seldom feature as “injustices” in political 
debates. I argue that, in re-politicising previously neutralised areas of social life, legitimate 
acts of condemnation can play a crucial critical role: they can raise awareness and fuel 
important public debates over how pervasive injustices reproduce unimpeded. Given the 
invisibility of complex injustices and the entrenched portrayal thereof as “misfortunes”, I 
argue that denunciations can be vehicles for communicating democratic interpellations: they 
can invite the passive onlooker to take a position regarding the plight of the victims of 
“misfortune”, thus becoming a reflective spectator who can think politically and consider 
various forms of political redress. 
While denunciations can target a multitude of invisible systemic injustices and can 
take a variety of forms, this paper deals with the particular case of societies with a past of 
political violence and analyses two theatrical denunciations. In order to avoid taking 
responsibility for the plight of victims, many societies re-describe the past in the language of 
“tragedy”, “catastrophe”, “necessity”, or simply “misfortune.” Thus, a serious reckoning with 
those aspects of the culture that made abuses possible place is obfuscated. The paper focuses 
on how condemnations communicated through the medium of theatre – professional or 
amateur – can help the passively unjust onlookers see beyond the language of “misfortune.” 
 The paper begins with Judith Shklar’s correct diagnosis of an important pathology 
marring constitutional democracies today: complex injustices often passing as “misfortunes” 
that nobody is responsible for. Conveniently protected by such language, politicians and 
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citizens turn their eyes away from suffering, thus contributing to the reproduction of 
injustices across generations. Building on Shklar’s account of passive injustice, I 
conceptualise denunciations as one possible way of fulfilling one’s civic duty to condemn the 
suffering to which everyone turns a blind eye. Provided denunciations are oriented by liberal 
democratic principles, they can help promote accountability and societal reflection over the 
past and its relation to the future (Section I). However, in order to be effective, denunciations 
must also reverberate in the community. I argue that denunciations communicated in the 
language of theatre can be particularly powerful. Taking Hannah Arendt’s views on 
spectatorship as a starting point, this paper argues that denunciatory theatre can reveal the 
political nature of “misfortunes” and invite the public to reflect (Section II). In view of 
illustrating my argument, I first examine the Argentinean practice of escraches – public 
denunciatory performances meant to “uncover” criminals and, more importantly, to provoke 
the indifferent onlookers to think politically. The street enactments targeted the amnestied 
henchmen of the military regime that governed the country between 1976 and 1983 and 
confronted the complacent public for whom impunity had become normal (Section III). Next, 
I present Thomas Bernhard’s theatre piece Heldenplatz – another political denunciation 
expressed in artistic language. The piece targeted a nation’s hypocritical embracing of a 
convenient lie about a historical “catastrophe”:  the lie that Austria had been Hitler’s first 
victim in World War II (Section IV). Both cases will be analysed with a view to highlighting 
theatrical denunciations’ role in triggering important debates about neutralised injustice. I 
will then try to derive the lessons these two examples can teach us in terms of the role that 
public condemnations can play in a democracy (Section V).  
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I. Passive Injustice 
The importance of the regulative function that moral outrage by victims and witnesses can 
perform publicly constitutes the focus of Judith Shklar’s account of citizen duties in her 
seminal The Faces of Injustice.vi No theory of justice is complete without an account of the 
experience of injustice, and, since she considers political action motivated by proper 
indignation to be the marker of good citizenship, her main purpose is to distinguish injustices 
from misfortunes. Injustice covers the realm of the social and the controllable and constitutes 
an appropriate occasion for public outrage and condemnation. Misfortunes, on the other hand, 
being unavoidable or natural, do not justify any form of retaliation. Sadly, many injustices are 
often portrayed as misfortunes, i.e. as nobody’s fault or responsibility. While the line between 
the two is a political line – and a difficult one to draw – Shklar argues that it is important to 
give everyone a hearing and find ways to promote accountability within a constitutional 
democracy. This implies criticising citizens and officials when they turn their eyes away from 
suffering or when they start talking of misfortune – when they really should be talking of 
injustice: “the difference between misfortune and injustice frequently involves our 
willingness and our capacity to act or not to act on behalf of the victims. To blame or to 
absolve, to help, mitigate and compensate or just to turn away.”vii And that, she thinks, 
amounts to injustice. 
 For Shklar, actively violating the norms of our society – written and unwritten – is 
not the only form of injustice plaguing constitutional democracies. A more insidious form of 
injustice involves failing to prevent or report inequities and injuries when we witness them:  
... by passive injustice I do not mean our habitual indifference to the misery of others, 
but a far more limited and specifically civic failure to stop public and private acts of 
injustice … As citizens we are passively unjust when we do not report crimes, when 
we look the other way when we do see cheating and minor thefts, when we tolerate 
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political corruption, and when we silently accept laws that we regard as unjust, 
unwise or cruel.viii  
The duty to stop and call injustices around us is not a requirement of charity or human 
goodness, of heroism or supererogation. It is a civic duty, a duty of all citizens to help 
reproduce the ethos that makes democratic institutions possible. The passively unjust person 
remains silent because she deems speaking too costly. In order to avoid legal liability, social 
opprobrium, political repercussions or her own pangs of conscience, she calls injustices 
“misfortunes.” In doing so, she neutralises any attempt to debate politically about 
misfortunes, thus becoming a “morally deaf and disassociated”ix onlooker. Consequently, 
victims are often invisible because the injuries they suffer are not thought of as injuries: their 
perspective is not taken into account.  Many “unfortunate” victims are left out, silenced and 
disappointed. The examples Shklar gives in her book range from the simplest scenarios to the 
most complex patterns of passive injustice, involving onlookers who tolerate unjust laws and 
portray preventable injustices as “misfortunes” or “disasters”. Market generated injustices, 
war crimes, and gender-based injustices are just three examples of abuses neutralised by 
references to “invisible hands”, “necessity”, and “nature”, outside the scope of the political. 
Consequently, no inclusive debate over potential remedies is possible. 
The capacity to identify injustice needs to be supplemented by a desire to act on one’s 
assessments and speak out publicly. Of course, our outraged sense of justice can be 
misguided – oversensitive, lacking proof or solid arguments, or undemocratic. What is more, 
the indignant might turn out to be dangerous fanatics. The only way to know whether public 
anger is legitimate is to allow everyone to voice their concerns in inclusive political 
deliberations.  
The biggest problem, however, is the laziness of the sense of justice: the failure to 
think politically about injustices, Shklar says, is typical of the citizens of constitutional 
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democracies, who enjoy its benefits but do nothing to contribute to its promise. Not acting on 
one’s sense of injustice goes against the minimal ethos all democracies seek to cultivate in 
their citizens. And this is ever so troubling since, in contrast with the citizens of oppressive 
regimes, citizens of democracies always enjoy opportunities to freely condemn injustice.  
With Shklar, this paper argues that public expressions of outrage and condemnation 
can contribute to the health of democratic societies. Unlike indifference and apathy, outrage 
reminds us of the perpetually imperfect nature of legitimation processes. In the sections that 
follow I try to show how public denunciations represent one among many possible courses of 
action that citizens can adopt in fulfilling their duty not to be passively unjust. Denunciations 
can offer an alternative perspective to the depoliticising common sense and stimulate political 
deliberations. But, in order for denunciations to count as legitimate, they must be based on a 
correct assessment of the denial of equality. Self-righteous, unduly moralising, and 
disproportional responses – responses that deny the unjust their own equal moral personhood 
– are not democratically appropriate. Defamatory denunciations, denunciations that incite to 
violence or hatred, and denunciations that scapegoat are just a few examples of the kind of 
practices that are incompatible with democratic principles. While denunciation can be a 
powerful force of social change, it can also serve undemocratic purposes. However, if 
motivated by a concern with what is owed to everyone as a member of the political 
community and expressed in ways that reverberates in the audience, it can stimulate 
important debates and catalyse institutional redress.   
Denunciations can target both active and passive injustice, yet their task is much more 
difficult when targeting injustice that has become invisible by neutralisation. Legitimate 
denunciations are not always successful: they often fail to reach their audiences and start 
political debates. What form should denunciations take to be effective? Is law an appropriate 
language when the injustices are not even considered illegal? Catherine MacKinnon and 
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Andrea Dworkin’s anti-pornography ordinances or Nkosinathi Biko’s challenge of the South 
African TRC arguably constitute legal denunciations. What about art, the destruction of art or 
books? Pussy Riot’s interventions and the mutilation of a figure in a statue glorifying King 
Leopold’s colonial policy are examples of denunciations of systemic injustice involving art. 
Michelle Alexander’s book The New Jim Crow recently provoked important reactions in the 
US. What about the standing of the denunciator? According to Shklar, all citizens have 
standing to talk when they see abuses. But who is likely to be listened? The profile of the 
speaker greatly influences the chances of “success.” Charisma, good choice of stories, 
mastery of the language the public is likely to react to, attention to the timing, the media 
exposure and the venue where the denunciation is made public, these are all variables to be 
factored in when making a denunciation.  
In what follows I build on Arendt’s account of stories as important mechanisms for 
cognitively and morally grasping unprecedented atrocities. Section II will aim to show that 
denunciatory stories can also reveal the political character of injustices and confront those 
who conveniently embrace the language of “misfortune”. I argue that storytelling can re-
politicise previously depoliticised areas of human interaction and invite citizens to change 
from passive onlookers into reflective spectators.   
 
II. From Passive Onlookers to Reflective Spectators 
This section looks into Arendt’s views on storytelling as a product of, and an invitation to, 
reflective spectatorship.x Interpreters of Arendt tend to agree that stories play a double role in 
her work. First, storytelling features as a preferred method for Arendt the political theorist 
facing unprecedented moral and epistemic challenges: the Holocaust and totalitarianism.xi 
Secondly, stories about particular situations or events represent reflective judgments that can 
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open our eyes and get the public thinking. They can provoke our reflection much more 
efficiently than philosophical arguments.xii  
Arendt’s views on critical spectatorship and storytelling emerge from many sources. 
First, she tries to come to grips with the historically unprecedented crimes of Stalinism and 
Nazism. Good stories are disclosive as their use of language shocks us in ways that reveals 
new meanings. She argues that our inherited categories of thought are useless for our efforts 
to grasp these crimes cognitively and morally. New categories, derived from within the 
particular experience of the 20th C violence, are better at capturing the novelty of these 
crimes. The spectator’s judgments take the form of stories about “totalitarianism” and the 
“banality of evil”, free of obsolete criteria, but disclosive of the meaning of recent history.xiii   
As many commentators noticed,xiv this account of storytelling restricts the capacity to 
judge to moments of crisis – when tradition no longer provides us with useful guidance. A 
broader understanding of spectatorship and stories emerges from her work on Kant’s 
aesthetics. Here, she builds on the distinction between determinant judgment – the faculty 
that enables us to apply pre-given norms to a concrete situation – and reflective judgement, 
which works within the complexity of the situation and attempts to derive the general from 
the particular. The main figure in this account is the spectator – historian or artist – who can 
sufficiently detach herself from certain exemplary historical events to make sense of their 
historical novelty, without the help of “banisters.”  
The idea of “enlarged mentality”, i.e. of imaginatively placing oneself in the shoes of 
the other, of “going visiting”, is meant to show how the spectator’s judgments gain validity.xv 
For Arendt, there is no Archimedean point from where to judge validity: given that politics is 
the realm of plurality, every point is Archimedean and judgment is perspectival.xvi The wider 
the scope of one’s enlarged mentality, i.e. the higher the number of positions one occupies in 
making a judgment, the greater the judgment’s generality.xvii In the process of “going 
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visiting” imagination plays a crucial role: it is through imagination that we take enough 
distance from the familiar so as to see things that would otherwise pass unnoticed. In visiting 
we aim to understand how a problem looks from the perspective of imagined others.xviii And 
artists are, in Arendt’s view, more capable of taking enough distance to tell a story from an 
unfamiliar position, without thereby falling into the temptation of absolute separateness – 
something Arendt thinks is typical of most philosophers.xix Reflective spectators, on the 
contrary, only exist in the plural: judging is detached, but remains publicly spirited because 
the spectator populates her imagination with a cast of characters. In addition, she anticipates 
presenting her story to an audience that is invited to draw their own conclusions.xx  
A good story, i.e. a story that can provoke reflection in the public, is one that “can 
make explicit the assumptions that determine the standards and practices of a particular 
regime but are so essential to its foundation and structure that they are never stated and, 
hence, not visible to outsiders or insiders but only to visitors.”xxi For example, Arendt often 
referred to Kafka’s stories that could shake a public out of its complacency by presenting as 
sinister what passed as “normal” in a society.xxii Such stories can invite the public’ 
imagination to go visiting and imagine how an issue looks from the perspective of a different 
other. The hope is that the spectators, upon listening to the narration, will respond by working 
towards a change in their political universe.xxiii  
What does this all mean for our interest in unmasking invisible injustices through 
denunciations? I argue that Shklar’s passively unjust citizens are apathetic onlookers, who 
prefer to turn their eyes away from injustice: they fail to visit the perspective of the 
“unfortunate” other. They are not spectators in the Arendtian sense, they are willing prisoners 
of the language of “misfortune”, who act in a world where large areas of human suffering 
have been neutralised and depoliticised. Reflective judgment has no place in these areas, for 
they are considered to be within the realm of necessity, outside the political. 
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Theatrical denunciations can tell stories that provoke the apathetic onlooker to become 
reflective about her own attitude to injustice. The theatrical format of the denunciation is 
relevant because the onlooker is, in a sense, confronted by the poet, who shows her how 
“misfortunes” look from the perspective of the victims. The passively unjust are challenged 
with silenced stories, stories that can show the inadequacy of the language of “misfortune” or 
“necessity”. There is a relationship of homology between the concrete spectator who 
witnesses the story in the theatre and the onlooker who witnesses injustices in everyday 
politics. Because of the similar structure in the relationship between spectator/citizen – 
story/injustice, and because of the public nature of theatre, dramaturgical denunciations might 
be important means for driving home the message that we need to reflect on the categories 
through which we see the world.  
But what stories are likely to provoke reflection and successfully help us see the world 
differently? Lisa Disch proposes that reflection-inducing narratives are different from both 
testimonies and illustrations of abstract principles: 
A skilful storyteller teaches her readers to see as she does, not what she does, 
affording them the “intoxicating” experience of seeing from multiple perspectives but 
leaving them with the responsibility to undertake the critical task of interpretation for 
themselves.xxiv 
Given our interest in complex injustices, the novelty of denunciatory stories is not that they 
deal with the unprecedented, but that they teach the passive spectators to see as the storyteller 
sees: politically. In other words, they talk about depoliticised issues in a political language. 
Such language confronts us to see issues previously left outside the scope of the controllable 
as issues covered by human responsibility. The goal is to encourage passive onlookers to 
distance themselves from the narrative of “misfortune” and consider what kind of society 
they should build in the future, given the unsavoury past. 
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 In what follows I will present two denunciations related to a history of political 
violence. H.I.J.O.S. and Thomas Bernhard denounced the henchmen of dictatorial Argentina 
and Nazi Austria and the passive onlookers who allowed injustices to remain unaddressed. 
My interest here lies not so much with the direct perpetrators, but with the wider public, who 
did not engage politically with their unsavoury past. Bernhard targeted the public’s neutrality 
regarding the fact that Nazi officials still occupied positions of power decades after the war: 
his play Heldenplatz constitutes an exhortation addressed to all citizens to reflect on the myth 
of Austrian victimhood and re-imagine a different future. Similarly, H.I.J.O.S. targeted 
torturers and murderers from various levels in the hierarchy of command, but particularly the 
communities within which they led comfortable lives, decades after the fall of the regime. 
Their disruptive street performances were meant to provoke Argentineans to stop tolerating 
systemic impunity, at that time widely embraced as “necessary” for peace, and start 
discussing the flaws in the Argentinean democracy. In both cases, injustice had achieved the 
status of “misfortune.” Austria had cultivated a narrative about the tragic occupation by Nazi 
Germany, while Argentineans had bought into the idea that justice was the price they had to 
pay for democracy: had the military not been amnestied and pardoned, they would have 
staged another coup. In what follows, I look at these two cases through the theoretical lenses 
offered by Shklar and Arendt and try to unpack the functions that theatrical denunciations can 
perform in a democracy. 
 
III. Denunciatory Street Performance: H.I.J.O.S. and the Eschraches 
Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina suffered under the violent rule of military juntas. During 
this period – also dubbed the “dirty war” – between 10,000 and 30,000 leftists 
“disappeared.”xxv Naturally, the junta claimed not to have any knowledge of what was 
happening.xxvi  
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Just before losing power after the Falkland Islands war, the military passed a self-
amnesty law, the 22924 National Pacification Law, meant – supposedly – to set the ground 
for reconciliation. This law stipulated a blanket amnesty for all subversive and counter-
subversive actions organised between May 1973 and June 1982.xxvii Thus, the officers left 
power ensuring that human rights abuses would not be prosecuted.  
Immediately after the elections, president Alfonsín argued against the constitutionality 
of the National Pacification Law, which eventually got nullified. As a consequence, the 
prosecution of the top military and leftist guerrilla fighters began.xxviii The 1985 trial of the 
junta leaders was met with great public excitement. The main narrative that came from the 
defence team was that the “dirty” methods used in the “dirty” war were justified as 
“necessary” given the left’s desire to subvert the public order. In an attempt to neutralise 
injustice, the generals argued that, given the stakes of such a “war”, every possible measure 
had to be taken.xxix The court remained unconvinced and Generals Videla, Massera, Agosti, 
Viola, and Lambruschini were convicted to time in prison.xxx The trial’s main shortcoming 
was its not-so-clear stance on “due obedience.” This ambiguity cleared the way for further 
prosecutions of lower-rank officers. Naturally, the military drew ranks and threatened to 
disrupt the already fragile peace.xxxi In response, the president and his aides prepared two 
laws intended to limit the impact of prosecutions. The first was the “Full Stop Law” (23492 
Punto Final, 1986), which gave courts and prosecutors sixty days in which to press charges. 
Unexpectedly, the courts proved very diligent in prosecuting a great number of cases before 
the term expired, working even during their vacation period. As a consequence, the military 
organised a rebellion, which resulted in the passing of the “Due Obedience Law” (23521 
Obediencia Debida, 1987). This law limited responsibility to the highest ranks of the military 
and halted proceedings for all the trials against middle-rank officers.xxxii The final blow for 
victims and their families came shortly after: President Menem pardoned all officers 
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convicted for their crimes in the “dirty war.”xxxiii Menem argued that peace and democracy 
could not thrive for as long as there was a deep rift between civilians and the military. While 
survivors and relatives of victims fiercely contested his narrative, it slowly infiltrated the 
public culture of the Argentinean society.  
From a socio-psychological point of view, these events had important repercussions 
on the Argentine society. On the one hand, one could observe widespread apathy and a highly 
problematic tolerance towards los represores, who continued to live next door to their victims 
and complacent bystanders. Argentineans serviced their cars in the garages where the 
regime’s henchmen used to torture and kill its political opponents.xxxiv The discourse about 
the necessity of the amnesty laws and the pardons had become widely internalised. Torturers 
and murderers led peaceful lives in Buenos Aires, and were even invited to participate in talk-
shows by journalists seeking high ratings. They could publicly recount their atrocities, under 
the protection of the law. Sometimes, they were elected to public office: impunity became 
normal.xxxv  
On the other hand, strongly mobilised groups, especially those associated with the 
relatives of desaparecidos, began to put increased pressure on subsequent governments. 
Political mourningxxxvi became a new form of democratic participation and so were marches 
against impunity, litigation, and various public rituals that expressed the relatives’ resistance 
and abhorrence towards the unjust laws.xxxvii  
In this paper, I will look into the escraches, a form of public theatrical denunciation 
associated with H.I.J.O.S.,xxxviii the association founded by the children of the disappeared but 
boasting a wide social basis. Escrachar means, in the slang of Buenos Aires, “to reveal”, “to 
uncover”, “to expose”. As rituals of disclosure and condemnation, the escraches became one 
of the most powerful weapons against the amnestied and especially against the generalised 
public complacency.  
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The escrache involved careful preparation and planning that started long before the 
date of the actual event. Gathering relevant and reliable information was the first step. 
H.I.J.O.S. usually relied on the archives of the Madres and on the legal documents that 
stipulated the victimiser’s participation in the repression. Most of the escracheados had been 
prosecuted before the passing of the Punto Final law and the subsequent pardons, hence the 
information about their case was public and reliable.xxxix Finding a recent photo of the 
victimiser constituted a crucial task, since de-anonymising a victimiser required naming the 
name but also pointing out the face. Activists would then move into the public space of the 
neighbourhood, meet with community associations, artists, interest groups and individuals, 
hand out information about the identity of the victimiser, and mobilise the locals’ support. 
Posters with the photo of the represor, his name, address, his crimes as well as the place, date 
and time of the escrache were distributed in advance.  
On the day, the demonstrators would gather in a park or in any other common space 
and then march towards the assassin’s house. They would carry giant dolls and effigies, play 
music, give speeches in which they named him as a torturer and warned his neighbours about 
his presence in their building or on their street. They distributed pamphlets, presented 
improvised theatre scenes, made lots of noise, wrote denunciations on the sidewalks and 
walls of the victimiser’s house, rolled in military pigs-on-wheels, and symbolically threw red 
paint on the doorstep.xl A manifesto was typically read, promising that the struggle for justice 
would continue for as long as the state failed to deliver it. The image of a future community 
where impunity would no longer be tolerated served as a reference point at all moments in the 
escrache. Uncomfortable questions were asked in the street performance: “Did you know that 
your neighbour was a torturer? How do you feel about working with him? Or serving him 
lunch? Or selling him cigarettes?”xli The rallying slogan – “30,000 disappeared peers are 
present, now and forever” – meant that the voices of the disappeared could be heard through 
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the voices of the participants: their perspective could no longer be overlooked. Poster size 
photos of the disappeared made their symbolic presence even more powerful. 
In many cases, the represores, knowing what was about to happen, would get the 
support of the courts and the police. The demonstrators would often find police pickets 
surrounding the house of the victimiser. Some actors would join the police lines bearing 
banners, which read: “Serving impunity.” Sometimes, the neighbours joined the 
demonstrators in their denunciation and subsequently started avoiding the victimiser. This 
was the hoped-for effect of the demonstration: getting Argentineans to understand that the 
normalisation of impunity should be condemned and fought against peacefully: the future 
could look differently. Others shut themselves in their houses, turned off the light, and waited 
for the event to be over. Some parents took their children elsewhere, to prevent them from 
getting contaminated with this anti-social, “hooligan” behaviour. 
A special kind of escrache uncovered places, rather than people. Such is the 2000 
escrache of two torture and detention sites in Buenos Aires, the Olimpo and the Orletti 
garages. In such cases, the garages were re-described as “concentration camps.” The activists 
would advance holding hands, singing or chanting: “Neighbours, listen up! Did you know 
that you live next to a concentration camp? While you were at home, cooking veal cutlets, 
people were being tortured in those camps.”xlii By calling garages “camps”, these places were 
re-integrated into the space of the political. The semantic shock was addressed to the passive 
neighbours, too busy cooking their meals when thousands of victims were being exterminated 
next door. The activists would write in yellow paint all the crimes committed in those horrid 
sites, thus marking the place as one of injustice, not one of car service. An alternative, 
political geography of the city emerges from the escrache: the audience is invited to examine 
the map of injustice from the perspective of those whose families had been exterminated and 
decide how they can reinvent the Argentinean democracy.  
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On a first reading, these performances mainly targeted the torturers and assassins, 
aiming to make it extremely difficult for them to lead a normal life. Once the denunciation 
was made publicly, the hope was that the victimiser would find it difficult to leave his house 
for fear of social censure. Given that the state had failed to send these wrongdoers to prison, 
the H.I.J.O.S. symbolically imprisoned them in their own house. Upon closer examination, 
however, it becomes clear that the main purpose of these rituals was to shake the conscience 
of the apathetic Argentinean onlookers and rally citizens’ support in the effort to unmask and 
ostracise the hundreds of assassins living free and satisfying lives under the protection of the 
amnesty laws and Menem’s pardon. Denouncing the normalisation of impunity, such rituals 
constitute strategies for re-politicising the public space in ways that discloses the inadequacy 
of the language of “historical necessity.” Interpellation targeted the passive witnesses who, 
fearing inconvenience, condoned the abuses of the military. The hope was that, once citizens 
became aware that “necessity” was a sham, they could start a debate over what to do so as to 
remedy these important democratic deficits. 
The escraches played an important role in raising awareness about the importance of 
the struggle for memory and justice in Argentina. Alongside sustained legal mobilisation and 
the political mourning of the Madres, these denunciations helped provoke reflection over 
citizens’ duty not to tolerate grave injustice. By challenging the complacency of those who 
had not been victims of military repression and inviting them to rethink their position 
regarding the “necessity” of the amnesties, H.I.J.O.S. helped unmask not only the dictators 
and their henchmen – those who had been actively unjust – but also the silent onlookers – the 
passively unjust. By showing how “necessity” looks from the perspective of the families of 
the victims, the street performances forced whole communities to confront their own position 
to the past of injustice. The neighbours were, willy-nilly, concrete spectators to the dramatic 
story that the H.I.J.O.S presented. As onlookers, they faced uncomfortable truths. Impunity 
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was not a “necessity”, but a political decision that tainted the Argentinean democracy and 
rendered it imperfectly legitimate.  
The efforts by these civil society groups did not remain without results. The legal 
loophole that allowed for the first breakthrough in the fight against impunity was the fact that 
neither the amnesty laws, nor Menem’s pardon covered crimes against babies. During the 
years of the dictatorship, babies born in prison had been stolen and given to military families 
who could not have children of their own. Once the widespread and systematic practice of 
stealing babies was uncovered, prosecutions of officers that had been formerly pardoned by 
president Menem began. On March 6, 2001, Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo of the Buenos 
Aires Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the “Full Stop” and “Due Obedience” laws were 
unconstitutional.xliii In 2005, after a protracted quest for justice, the Supreme Court 
definitively invalidated these abhorrent laws.xliv Twenty-two years after the end of the 
dictatorships, the argument about the “necessity” of the dirty war and of these legal 
instruments no longer held.xlv As a particularly important mark of the success of the escrache, 
this form of protest has been taken over by others groups who are currently using it for 
denouncing banks, the police, ministers, companies, polluters and others.xlvi 
 
IV. Denunciation in the Burgtheater: Thomas Bernhard’s Heldenplatz 
Thomas Bernhard is one of Austria’s most renowned writers, both at home and abroad. He is, 
at the same time, one of the most controversial figures of the 20th century Austrian art scene: 
somebody one can either deeply appreciate or deeply hate. Given the focus of this paper, I 
will present Bernhard as an exemplary denunciator of Austria’s participation in the Holocaust 
and its subsequent efforts to portray itself as Hitler’s first tragic victim. While Bernhard’s 
condemnation of his compatriots’ support for National-Socialism emerges again and again 
throughout his work, it is Heldenplatz – his last play – that constitutes the clearest 
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enunciation of his uncompromising indignation at the racism permeating Austria fifty years 
after its peaceful annexation by Nazi Germany – the Anschluss.   
 The “victim theory” – the theory according to which Austria was overpowered by 
Nazi Germany and annexed at the point of a bayonet – played a crucial role in its political 
and cultural definition as a distinct state after World War II.xlvii The annexation was described 
as an aberration in Austrian history, a tragic and unavoidable event. Austrians embraced this 
theory as a convenient alibi in post-war negotiations.xlviii What is more, it was conveniently 
invoked to avoid any discussion of the support Hitler enjoyed in Austria and the warm 
welcome he received upon arriving in Heldenplatz in 1938. The “beneficiary” of a much 
more restricted denazification, Austria was marred by political and cultural continuities with 
a past of shameful complicity in Nazi crimes.  
Bernhard – born in 1931 – was among the first in his generation to denounce this 
reality. He knew that many in positions of power had been National-Socialists. Particularly 
shameful for Austria – the self-styled country of “high culture” who supposedly “survived” 
Nazism only through its culture – many managers of the cultural institutions and winners of 
the most prestigious cultural awards after the war had been National-Socialists.xlix As an actor 
and playwright, he knew that returning Jewish actors had to play alongside Nazi actors.l 
Bernhard took it upon himself to shed light into the darkness cultivated by all beneficiaries of 
this myth. He was particularly bothered by how his generation had been gullible enough to 
believe the story their parents told them.li For the fierce, vitriolic, unambiguous language that 
his characters spoke in denouncing the Austrian founding myth, Bernhard won the 
“honorary” title of Nestbeschmutzer (nest soiler). 
Of all his plays and novels, none got as much attention – both positive and negative – 
as Heldenplatz.lii The play tells the story of a Jewish family who fled to Britain during World 
War II and whose members returned to Vienna in the 1980s, only to be confronted with the 
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same anti-Semitism they ran away from in 1938.  In the first scene, through the voices of two 
servants, we learn that brothers Josef and Robert Schuster, both intellectuals, had fled – with 
their families – at the beginning of the conflagration and had worked as professors in Oxford 
and Cambridge. In the 1980s they return to Vienna in search of the wonderful cultural life 
that, as Austrians, they longed for while abroad. They find, however, that they can no longer 
find a home – culturally and literally – in Austria. Robert retires to the countryside and 
resigns himself to his own impending death. Josef’s wife suffers from deep psychological 
trauma, re-activated by her return to the apartment overlooking Heldenplatz, from where she 
heard the crowds cheering Hitler in 1938. Josef, a strict perfectionist, an erudite and a perfect 
patriarch, could no longer tolerate the presence of Nazis in Vienna. He jumps to his own 
death from the balcony of the same apartment.   
The key moments are in the second scene, when Robert and Josef’s two daughters, 
Ana and Olga, walk home from the cemetery. They stop for a rest in Volksgarten Park. 
Through the fog the audience can see the image of the Burgtheater at the back of the stage. 
The Burgtheater is one of the three most important artistic institutions of Austria, along with 
the Staatsoper and the Musikvarein, and the play premiered there. Robert and Ana discuss the 
plight of their family and locate the source of their misfortune in the enduring racism and 
historical hypocrisy of the Austrians. The language is extremely strong and repetition drives 
the message home unambiguously. In Ana’s words: 
“today things are really 
the way they were in thirty-eight 
there are more Nazis in Vienna now 
than in thirty-eight”liii 
Robert shares his niece’s evaluation: 
“being a Jew in Austria always means 
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being sentenced to death 
People can write and say what they like 
hatred of Jews is the true and unadulterated nature 
of an Austrian 
Before thirty-eight the Viennese 
had got used to the Jews 
but now since the war they cannot get used to the Jews 
and they will never get used to the Jews (...) 
If they were honest 
they’d love to gas us 
today just as they did fifty years ago 
that’s what’s going on inside people 
I’m not mistaken 
if they could they’d kill us even today 
without scruple.”liv 
Having returned in search of their image of Austria as the land of sublime culture, of good 
music and coffee houses, the family had to face the pervasiveness of National-Socialist 
sentiments even in the most important cultural institutions. Josef could neither screen them 
out, nor could he, a city creature, withdraw in the countryside like his brother. His only exit 
was suicide.  
 The third scene takes place in the Schusters’ apartment. Robert reiterates his 
conviction that “in every Viennese there is a mass murderer” and that “under the surface 
National Socialism has been back in power for a long time.”lv The culminant moment of the 
play is the collapse of Josef’s wife, who has an attack during the dinner. While Robert is busy 
sharing his invectives with the guests at the dinner table, Frau Schuster starts hearing the 
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sound of cheering crowds coming from Heldenplatz and, as the noise in her mind grows 
stronger, she falls face-forward on the tabletop. The play ends with everyone’s shock at the 
sight.  
 The impact of the play cannot be understood without an excursus in the circumstances 
in which it was first played. Its performance came in the wake of the Waldheim affair. UN 
Secretary General and former Nazi officer, Kurt Waldheim was elected president of Austria 
in 1986, in spite of the airing of documents about his membership in the Nazi party, the SA 
and the Wehrmacht. His election as president was symptomatic of Austrians’ relationship to 
their past.lvi Bernhard wrote the play at the invitation of the director of the Burgtheater, Claus 
Peymann, for the occasion of the centenary of its building in 1988.lvii The centenary 
coincided with another “anniversary”: 1988 marked the passage of fifty years since the 
Anschluss. Initially, Bernhard did not want to write a new play, he felt he had said all he had 
to say about Austria’s lie in his previous work. Instead of a new play, he reportedly 
recommended that all the stores formerly owned by Jews in Vienna should bear a sign saying 
“judenfrei” (Jews-free). Eventually Peymann convinced Bernhard to write the play, and the 
opening night was set for October 14, 1988.  
The period before the premiere was marked by a number of controversies. In May 
1988, Peymann gave an explosive interview to an important newspaper, in which he 
criticised the actors and the corruption of the artistic establishment, while affirming his belief 
that theatre could spark social change. Given the centrality of the theatre in the Austrians’ 
identity, his statements were not taken lightly. That same summer fierce debates erupted 
between conservatives and the socialists over the location of a memorial by Alfred Hrdlicka 
dedicated to Jewish victims. The Socialist mayor of Vienna decided that it should be placed 
downtown, in the Albertinaplatz. The conservatives opposed this decision vehemently and 
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recommended its placement at a much less prominent location. In the end, the monument was 
installed centrally, to the dismay of its opponents.lviii  
Things got even tenser when the most inflammatory pages from Heldenplatz were 
leaked to the press. Many political figures felt outraged that public money should be spent on 
art that “defamed” the nation. Jörg Haider – the rising star of the political right – and 
Waldheim himself were the first to call Heldenplatz “an insult.” Waldheim asked for the play 
to be censored – the only time in the history of the second republic that a president had made 
such statements.lix  
A second memorial dedicated to the victims of the Nazis – built by Hans Haacke and 
located in Graz – was set on fire by neo-Nazis just before the opening night of the play.lx The 
event vindicated Bernhard, but aggravated the tensions. The main conservative newspaper 
indicated that setting the Burgtheater itself on fire was not “too hot”: they even published an 
image of the building in flames on their front page. 
 The play eventually opened on the 4th of November 1988 – five days before the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Kristallnacht. Two hundred policemen were deployed to ensure 
order. Rightwing activists dumped a load of manure in front of the theatre, a denunciation of 
the denunciator. The show was sporadically disturbed by hecklers and catcallers, whose 
vituperations confirmed Bernhard’s diagnosis of the “disease” that part of the Austrian public 
suffered from.   
The fact that Bernhard provoked such vehement reactions from his compatriots shows 
that he knew their weak spots and that a re-politicisation of history was overdue. It was 
communicated through the medium of art, a medium Austrians claim to be theirs naturally. 
The timing was symbolic, bringing together the anniversaries of the Anschluss and the 
Kristallnacht – two shameful events – and that of the building of the Burgtheater – one of the 
artistic institutions Austrians are most proud of. The play premiered in the Burgtheater, 
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whose building was also part of the set: the boundary between play and reality was blurred to 
maximal effect.lxi Rather than offering homage to “high culture” the play unmasked culture’s 
complicity in reproducing a story of “misfortune” and asked Austrians: “Is this the kind of 
society you want to be?”  
Robert directs his invectives at the public in a way they can understand him. He is an 
Austrian by all accounts – tastes, habits, and loyalties – but one: he is a Jew. The style leaves 
no room for interpretation or ambiguity. Exaggeration – Bernhard’s favourite stylistic device 
– is taken to the extreme: through ruthlessly repeated accusations, Robert condemns 
Austrians for their participation in the Holocaust and the perpetuation of a convenient lie: the 
lie that Austria was the tragic victim of a historical “catastrophe.” The founding myth is 
redescribed as a lie, not a tragedy: Austria had been a perpetrator, not a victim. At the same 
time, he invites the younger generations to reflect on the problematic myth their parents 
inculcated them with and debate the repercussions this self-serving distortion has for 
Austria.lxii  
Heldenplatz constitutes the best testimony of Bernhard’s “permanent rage against the 
moral catastrophe of Austrian history, and against post-war Austria’s failure to face that 
history. (…) an unforgiving, unapologetic venomously impassioned satire.”lxiii It divided the 
public: some celebrated it, others vilified his writer. The consensus today is that the play 
trapped the Nazis in positions of political power at the time and their supporters into 
revealing their undemocratic stances. At the same time – and most importantly – the play 
represented a wake-up call for the onlookers who turned a blind eye to this problematic 
reality. They heard the voice of a silenced victim, a voice that offered a different take on a 
problematic past. 
 Bernhard’s sanity was questioned and he was physically attacked in the street. He 
survived the opening night for three more months. In his will, he forbade the publishing of his 
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works and staging of his plays in Austria for the entire duration of the copyright. This was his 
final rejection and condemnation of his country. Austrians found a way to overrule his will 
and Bernhard is now one of the most read and studied authors in the country. 
While his work provoked great uproar in 1988, Austria is today a more reflexive place 
and it can be safely argued that Bernhard’s work had something to do with it. Nobody today 
would disturb the staging of Heldenplatz and no politician would oppose it. The play 
triggered impressive political debates that gradually re-oriented the public common sense in 
the country: the denunciation was successful. What is more, it is generally agreed that 
Bernhard is part of the Austrian Pantheon. Decades later, he is one of the most exported 
Austrian cultural product and the first in a long chain of authors who undertook the task of 
social criticism.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The two denunciations examined here provoked important public reactions. The semantic 
shocks the H.I.J.O.S. and Bernhard provoked were achieved not by coming up with new 
categories, but by calling “catastrophes” by their proper name: injustices. They politicised the 
realm of necessity through performances that managed to invite the passive onlooker to 
reflect on the categories through which she saw the world. The hope was that she would thus 
become a reflective spectator, ready to enter deliberation about the relationship of the past to 
the present and the future. In both cases stories played a disclosive function by using a 
political language in realms where it had not been applied before: to the realm of historical 
necessity or catastrophe.  
H.I.J.O.S. primarily aimed to expose the passive spectators who had gotten used to 
impunity. They tried to shake the public’s comfortable complacency by redrawing the 
political map of Buenos Aires. By naming names and naming places, the street artists invited 
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citizens to imagine how the city looked from the perspective of the victims and their families. 
Could they imagine what it felt like to eat, walk or read a newspaper next to the one who 
disappeared one’s relatives? Could they imagine what the victims felt in a society where 
impunity had become natural? Would they continue to service their cars in places where 
thousands of lives had been wasted? Having been informed about who these “respectable 
men” actually were, how did they see the future of the Argentinean democracy? In what 
terms should the debate be held? By asking these uncomfortable questions, H.I.J.O.S. 
symbolically brought to life the disappeared, whose voice could be heard in the chanting of 
the escrache. Given that today, long after the end of impunity, escraches are still organised to 
deal with other depoliticised issues such as market inequalities and corruption, one can argue 
that amateur theatrical denunciations represent an important form of political mobilisation 
with great impact on the health of the Argentinean democracy.  
In contrast to the H.I.J.O.S., Bernhard was invited to write for a particular occasion. 
The context of the premiere was incendiary, as was the content of the play. Bernhard used 
repetition and hyperbolae to drive home the message that life was impossible for the 
returning Jews, fifty years after the Annexation. Robert’s tirades are unforgiving and are told 
in a language that Austrians can perfectly understand, the language of the cultured elite. His 
biting criticism targeted Austria’s most cherished institutions. This exercise in exposure 
called on citizens to enter honest debates about the way in which they related to their past. 
While H.I.J.O.S. and Bernhard performed similar functions within their home 
societies, the differences between the two cases also need discussion. Berhnard was a 
professional playwright, enjoying a high level of notoriety at the time of the premiere of 
Heldenplatz. He was a consecrated writer, with a long and rich career behind him. As 
the coryphaeus of theatre in a country that lived for culture, he commanded the 
undivided attention of the public and the mass media. Moreover, the premiere of 
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Heldenplatz came at a highly charged moment: the anniversary of the Burgtheater, 
which coincided with the anniversary of the Anschluss and of the Kristallnacht. In 
contrast, H.I.J.O.S. had first to struggle to affirm themselves as a political movement. 
The organisation included the relatives of the disappeared and a large number of young 
Argentinean citizens who, without having themselves suffered losses during the 
dictatorship, identified with the political cause of the organisation. Their only venue was 
the street. Given their youth and the lack of public recognition for their cause, their task 
can be said to have been even more difficult than that facing Bernhard. One should not 
forget, however, that Argentina did experiment with transitional justice in the 1980s – 
something that Austria had not even considered at the time of the premiere. By 
capitalising on this precedent and by institutionalising their protest theatre, H.I.J.O.S. 
managed to have a comparable impact to that of Bernhard’s scathing play.  
Before concluding, let me consider a potential criticism: one might argue that 
denunciations are not usually understood to be dialogical and political in the way Arendt 
understands the political. This paper argues that, in challenging the terms of the political 
consensus, they represent important political interventions, meant to re-open prematurely 
closed debates. In this sense, they did not constitute final verdicts. On the contrary, the artists 
invited the audience to listen to an alternative view and make up their own mind on whether a 
political debate was appropriate. In intervening publicly, denunciators disclosed themselves 
and assumed some risks: Bernhard earned the nickname of Nestbeschmutzer, the H.I.J.O.S. 
were called “hooligans.” Initially, denunciations partially back-lashed: many passive 
onlookers refused to take up the invitation to deliberate sincerely. However, in retrospect, we 
can see that the professional artist, as much as the amateurs, succeeded in destabilising the 
language of “misfortune”, presented spectators with an alternative way of thinking about their 
past, and invited them to imagine a more inclusive future. 
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